Abstract-This study aims to find the effect of supervision characteristics of the board of commissioners on tax aggressiveness. Supervision characteristics of the board of commissioners are proxied by four proxies: risk management system and internal control, big-4 audit firm, external auditor independence, and independence of the internal audit committee. Tax aggressiveness is proxied with GAAP ETR. Based on regression result with random effect model, it was found that the supervision characteristics of the board of commissioners did not affect tax aggressiveness.
The tax ratio in Figure 1 is still considered low compared to the tax ratio of other countries. For example, Misbakhun who is a member of Commission XI of the House of Representatives stated that Indonesia is still categorized as lower middle income country with low tax ratio because the average value of tax ratio in lower middle income countries in 2015 is 17.7% (http: //www.republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/makro/16/11/21/ogzwd n336-dpr-request-the-government-only-reading-reformasipajak, January 16, 2017) . Another example is shown in Figure  2 . Misbakhun said that the low tax value of Indonesia shows the low awareness of taxpayers in paying taxes. Midiastuty et al. (2016) states that a lack of awareness of taxation is still experienced by taxpayers in Indonesia, especially corporate taxpayers. taxpayers Agency considers taxes as a burden that reduces income and does not provide direct rewards. This causes the taxpayers Agency to seek ways to reduce the tax burden or become aggressive in its taxation (Chen et al., 2010 in Midiastuty et al., 2016) . Frank et al. (2009) defines aggressive acts in taxation as an act aimed at revamping corporate taxable profits through tax planning, both legally and illegally. There are several proxies that can be used to measure tax aggressiveness, such as effective tax rate (ETR), book-tax differences (BTD), and unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) . Desai and Dharmapala (2006) in his research stated that the decision on tax aggressiveness done by the company made by management. This decision is made because management has the opportunity to benefit from the control they have over the company. Conversely, shareholders may not want management to engage in tax aggressiveness as it can provide greater opportunities for management to benefit themselves and tax aggressiveness does not always provide greater value to shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006) .
Shareholders may reduce the probability of corporate tax aggressiveness by management through the implementation of good corporate governance as stated by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO, 2006 (ATO, , 2010 in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) . In its tax compliance program, ATO stresses that the strength of corporate governance structures has a major impact on the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness. In Indonesia, the Directorate General of Taxes has not issued specific rules on governance of the WP Agency, but the Financial Services Authority (OJK) in the Indonesian Corporate Governance Roadmap states that the Indonesian government has generally paid special attention to the implementation of good corporate governance as stated in Law Number 40 Year 2007 regarding Limited Liability Company. As a capital market legislator, OJK has also issued OJK Regulation Number 21 / POJK.04 / 2015 on Implementation of Open Corporate Governance Guidelines and Circular Letter (SE) OJK Number 32 / SEOJK.04 / 2015 on Open Corporate Governance Guidelines.
One of the organs in corporate governance is the board of commissioners. Law Number 40 Year 2007 states that the duty of the board of commissioners is to supervise and give advice to the directors. In agency theory, shareholders as principals have limited access issues in overseeing management behavior as agents so management can act opportunistically (Bouckova, 2015) , so the task of this oversight is delegated to the board of commissioners.
Several studies have shown that supervisory characteristics by the board of commissioners have a role in reducing the likelihood of tax aggressiveness in companies. One is the Lanis and Richardson (2011) research which shows that the proportion of larger independent members of the board of commissioners is able to reduce the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. In Indonesia, the study of Midiastuty et al. (2016) also showed similar results to the research of Lanis and Richardson (2016) . Another example is Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) research that examines the application of risk management and internal control systems, the use of big-4 audit firms, the independence of external auditors, and the independence of the internal audit committees of open companies in Australia. The results of this study indicate that the four characteristics of supervision is able to reduce the possibility of aggressive action in taxation on the company. In Indonesia, Phinandito (2016) conducted a similar study by analyzing the effect of the implementation of the risk management system and internal controls, the use of big-4 audit firm services, and the independence of the internal audit committee on tax aggressiveness. The results of this study show only the use of services big-4 audit firm that has a significant influence on corporate tax aggressiveness.
Still lack of research in Indonesia similar to Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) research makes the writer interested to raise research with this theme. In addition, there are several large open companies that have implemented some of the four characteristics of supervision, but still have problems in taxation, namely PT Astra Otoparts Tbk and PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk. According to the Income Tax Act , the general rate of income tax on corporate taxpayers, which also applies to both companies, is 25%. However, the calculation of ETR, which is the result of the division of the Company's income tax to the company's pretax income, represents a 10.09% yield in 2012, 16.60% in 2013, and 13.69% in 2014 for PT Astra Otoparts Tbk and 10.79% in 2012, 23.95% in 2013, 24.19% in 2014 and 18.26% in 2015 for PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk. The author wants to know whether the value of ETR indicating an aggressive action in taxation by both companies is influenced by the application of supervisory characteristics by the board of commissioners.
During the year 2012 s.d. 2014, PT Astra Otoparts Tbk stated that it has implemented internal risk management and internal control system effectively in its annual report. PT Astra Otoparts Tbk also uses the services of a big-4 audit firm to audit its financial statements and all members of its audit committee are independent members. While PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk, during the period of 2012 s.d. 2015, states that it has implemented an internal risk management and internal control system effectively in its annual report and states that all members of the audit committee of the company are independent members.
The lack of research in Indonesia similar to Richardson's, Taylor's and Lanis's research (2013) and the still aggressive discovery of taxation by companies that impose some supervisory characteristics by their board of commissioners attracted the authors to research the theme. Therefore, the authors raise the title of this study as follows: "Influence Characteristics Supervision Board of Commissioners Aggressive to Corporate Taxes".
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A. Tax Aggressiveness Frank et al. (2009) defines tax aggressiveness as an act aimed at revamping corporate taxable profits through tax planning, both legally and illegally. The definition is in line with the definition of tax aggressiveness described by Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) , which is management action to decrease taxable income through tax planning activities in both legal areas, "gray" areas and illegal areas. But according to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , there is no general definition of tax aggressiveness as there is no generally accepted definition of tax avoidance.
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) stated that there is no clear boundary between tax avoidance and tax aggressiveness. There is a difference in subjectivity between individuals in defining how aggressive a behavior is to be referred to as tax evasion. However, many studies use various terms, such as tax aggressiveness, tax sheltering, tax evasion, and so on, to define tax planning activities approaching illegal areas (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) . Similarly, in this study, the tax aggressiveness measures referred to in this study are those approaching illegal areas.
According to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , there are several ways or proxies that can be used to measure tax aggressiveness, including GAAP effective tax rate (ETR), long-run ETR, book-tax differences (BTD), abnormal BTD, and unrecognized tax (UTB). The proxy used in this study is GAAP ETR, obtained through the distribution of income tax expense on income before tax. The effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of internal and external reporting, the compliance with laws and regulations, and internal policies.
B. Board of Commissioner
From the various definitions above, it can be concluded that both the risk management system and internal controls implemented by the company to provide adequate assurance on the achievement of corporate objectives. To that end, the Financial Report Council or FRC (2014) states that both must be run simultaneously as an indivisible unity. From the agency theory perspective, the risk management and internal control systems are part of the mechanisms established by management as agents to ensure that they will behave in the interests of shareholders as principals (Godfrey et al., 2006, 302) .
The internal control system has become the company's main corporate governance mechanism for managing risk (Rae et al., 2008 in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis, 2013) . The Board of Commissioners has a role as the holder of a key oversight mechanism to mitigate any residual losses incurred for shareholders and control agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The board of commissioners receives authority over internal control and other decisions of shareholders so that the board of commissioners has a position as the apex of decision control in the company (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis, 2013 Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) stated that the use of big-4 audit firm services can help companies reduce their tax aggressiveness through increased supervision and audit quality. According to Dewi and Jati (2014) , audit quality is any possibility that may occur when auditors audit auditee financial statements and find that there are violations that occur and report it in audited financial statements. There are four benchmarks in assessing audit quality, namely professionalism, accountability, integrity, and transparency (Tehupuring, 2016) . In relation to corporate taxes, firms tend to tax aggressiveness to avoid high tax reporting. Therefore, to ensure the quality of information related to taxation, the auditor is required to audit the financial statements of the company to ensure the reliability of information (Tehupuring 2016 ). Rezaee (2005) in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013, 72) argues that big-4 audit firms are more likely to detect financial reporting fraud than non-big-4 audit firms because they have greater ability to resist pressure of clients, paying more attention to reputation and big names, more resources (in the areas of engineering and technology expertise), and more advanced and systematic audit strategies and processes. However, the big-4 audit firm also has the possibility to develop and market various tax aggressive schemes that allow their clients to report high profits on the one hand and pay lower corporate taxes on the other (Sikka 2010 in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis, 2013). For example, the case of Enron in which the tax aggressiveness scheme was designed by Arthur Andersen and Deloitte and Touche.
Independence of External Auditor
According to Sikka and Hampton (2005) and Freise et al. (2008) in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013, 72) , the provision of non-audit services by an external auditor to its auditee company may affect the independence of the external auditor so that there is a debate regarding the precision of such non-audit services. Becker et al. (1998) Lanis (2013, 74) argues that there is evidence to support the idea that an independent audit committee can prevent aggressive financial reporting and accounting fraud. The audit committee is expected to be able to assess the nature of the accounting policies used as well as the accounting and taxation estimates made by the management company. The audit committee is also required to be able to measure the reasons for the use of methodologies and assumptions in preparing accounting and tax information, why audit adjustments are made, the role of management in the audit process, as well as the evaluation and evaluation of the integrity of the company's annual financial statements (Klein 2002 in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis, 2013).
C. Prior Research
Research that explicitly examines the relationship between important board supervisory characteristics, in addition to the composition of the board of commissioners, and corporate tax aggressiveness is still rare (Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis, 2013) . Here are some studies that have been done before: An Empirical Analysis, using tax aggressiveness as its dependent variable, as well as internal risk management and control systems, the external auditor, the independence of the external auditor, and the independence of the audit committee as an independent variable. The results obtained from this study are the four independent variables have a significant influence in reducing the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. Pinandhito (2016) , in his research entitled The Effect of Internal Control, Auditor Quality, Audit Committee Independence, Company Size, and Leverage Against Tax Aggressiveness, using tax aggressiveness as its dependent variable, as well as internal control and risk management systems, auditor quality, audit committee, firm size, and leverage as independent variables. The results obtained from this study is only the quality of auditors that significantly influence the aggressiveness of corporate taxes, while other independent variables are not.
D. Hypothesis
The hypothesis formulated in this study is derived from the results of research conducted by Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) which shows the result that supervision by the board of commissioners has a significant effect to reduce the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. Based on theoretical basis and the results of the prior research, the authors formulate the following hypothesis: H1: Assuming other factors remain, the company where its board of commissioners establishes an effective risk management and internal control system negatively affects corporate tax aggressiveness. H2: Assuming other factors remain, the use of big-4 audit firm services negatively affects the tax aggressiveness of the company. H3: Assuming other factors remain, the independence of a weak external auditor positively affects corporate tax aggressiveness. H4: Assuming other factors remain, the independence of the internal audit committee negatively affects the tax aggressiveness of the company.
III. RESEARCH METHOD

A. Scope
The scope of this research is the companies that have been included in the Compass 100 Index list for the period of 2012 s.d. 2015 and objects in this study is data from financial statements and annual reports of these companies that represent each variable in this study. 
B. Variables 1. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is represented by the corporate tax aggressiveness (TAG). The researchers collected the TAG measure directly from the company's financial statements using the proxy effective tax rates (ETR). The ETR used in this study is GAAP ETR. GAAP ETR is used because in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) research, hypothesis testing using this proxy gives the closest results to the results of hypothesis testing using the main proxy. The main proxy is measured using a dummy variable of the company's involvement in a tax dispute with ATO in terms of tax aggressiveness under Australian tax laws.
Independent Variable
The independent variables in this study include: a. Risk management system and internal control (RMS)
It is a statement of the company's management on the effectiveness of the risk management system and the internal controls prevailing in its company. RMS is expected to have a negative sign.
b. External auditor type (AUD)
It is the use of the services of big-4 audit firms or not by the company in auditing its annual financial statements. AUD is expected to have a negative sign. c. Independence of external auditors (EAI)
It is the financial dependence of the external auditor on the client company (auditee) due to the non-audit services provided. EAI is expected to have a positive sign. d. Independence of internal audit committee (ACI)
Is the proportion of independent members in the firm's audit committee. ACI is expected to have a negative sign.
Control Variables
The control variables in this study include: a. Company size (SIZE) SIZE was used in this study to control the effect of size. Prior research (Tran, 1997 in Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis, 2013; Richardson and Lanis, 2007) found that larger firms were more likely to be tax-aggressive because they had superior economic and political power over small firms (Siegfried, 1972 There are nine industrial sectors organized under the Jakarta Industrial Classification (JASICA), which include: the agricultural sector; mining sector; basic industrial and chemical sectors; various industry sectors; the consumer goods industry sector; property sector, real estate, and building construction; infrastructure, utilities and transport sectors; the financial sector; as well as trade, services and investment sectors. However, only eight sectors were used in this study, ie all sectors outside the financial sector. j. Effect year (YEAR) YEAR is a dummy variable and is included as a control variable in this study to control the differences in aggressive corporate tax activity that may exist during the 2012 sample s.d. 2015.
C. Model
In this study, the authors used the model used Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) in his research as follows:
D. Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing
This study uses panel data. The first step taken on the data that has been collected is to perform a descriptive statistical analysis.
After presenting the data using descriptive statistics conducted, it will be tested using three models of panel data testing. The three results of this test is one of the basic to choose the best model that can be used to test hypothesis in research. Chow Test, Lagrange Multiplier Test, and Hausman Test will be conducted to select the best model in research data. The model to be selected is between common effects models, fixed effects, and random effects.
After obtaining the best model to get the regression equation according to the research data, it will be tested classical assumption. Classic assumption tests include autocorrelation test, normality test, multicollinearity test, and heteroscedasticity test. Autocorrelation test can be done by conducting Durbin-Watson test. Multicollinearity test can be done by using linear regression to see the correlation between independent variables used in the study. Heteroskedasticity test can be done by conducting Glejser test and analysis of plots data result in diagram form. While the data normality test can be done by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and analysis of the normal result of probability plots. The classical assumption test will be selected based on the result of regression model selection.
Multiple linear regression testing is done by model approach which has been chosen to take the conclusion whether the model can explain the effect of independent variable to dependent variable simultaneously (Fifth Significance Test). Hypothesis testing is done by t-test. The t test statistic value of the independent variables can be used to assess the effect of independent variables individually on the dependent variable of the study.
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
A. Sampling Table 1 shows the results of the sample selection that has been implemented. The result of purposive sampling in this research are 51 companies and preliminary observation data used in this research is 204 company-years. 
B. Descriptive Statistics
The author performs a descriptive statistical analysis of the research data as shown in Appendix 1, using the Eviews program 9. Some outputs of the analysis are as follows: mean; median; maximum; minimum; and sum.
C. Hypothesis Testing
After the model selection as described in the previous section, it is found that the appropriate model is a random effect model. Then, after doing BLUE test and random effect regression analysis hence got result as showed in appendix 2.
Determination Coefficient
Appendix 2 shows the value of R2 overalls in this study is 0.2440. This means that the contribution of all variables in the model to the variation of dependent variable is 24.40%, while the rest, which is 75.60%, is explained by other factors not included in the regression model in this study.
F-test
Appendix 2 shows prob score> chi2 in this study is 0.0004. The prob value> chi2 is smaller than alpha (5%) so H0 is rejected or all variables in the model simultaneously have a significant effect on the dependent variable.
t-test
Based on Table 3 taken from appendix 2, H0 is accepted for all independent variables in this study. RMS, AUD, and ACI variables have P> │z│ value above alpha (0,05), whereas EAI variable has regression coefficient marks that do not match with prediction marks. 
Hypothesis 1 testing
The first hypothesis (H1) in this study is assuming other factors remain, the company where its board of commissioners determines the system of risk management and effective internal control negatively affect the aggressiveness of corporate tax. To know the acceptance or rejection of this hypothesis, must be seen how the influence of risk management system variables and internal control (RMS) to variable aggressiveness of corporate taxation (TAG). Table 2 shows that the P> │z│ value of the RMS variable is 0.1865 and the resulting coefficient sign is (-) or negative. The decision taken is that H1 is rejected or with other fixed factor assumptions, the company where its board of commissioners establishes an effective risk management system and internal control does not negatively affect the tax aggressiveness of the company. This result is contrary to the results of research by Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013).
Hypothesis 2 testing
The second hypothesis (H2) in this study is assuming other factors remain, the use of services big-4 audit firm negatively affect the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. To know the acceptance or rejection of this hypothesis, it must be seen how the influence of external auditor type variable (AUD) to the variable aggressiveness of corporate taxation (TAG). Table 2 shows that the P> │z│ value of the AUD variable is 0.4890 and the resulting coefficient sign is (-). Decision taken is H2 rejected or with other factor assumptions remain, the use of services big-4 audit firm does not negatively affect the aggressiveness of corporate tax. This result is contrary to the results of research by Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013).
Hypothesis 3 testing
The third hypothesis (H3) in this study is assuming other factors remain, the independence of a weak external auditor positively affect the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. To know the acceptance or rejection of this hypothesis, it must be seen how the influence of external auditor independence variable (EAI) to variable aggressiveness of corporate taxation (TAG). Table 2 shows that the P> │z│ value of the EAI variable is 0,0005 and the resulting coefficient sign is (-) or negative so that the decision taken is H3 rejected or with other factor assumptions fixed, the independence of a weak external auditor has no effect positive against corporate tax aggressiveness. This result is contrary to the results of research by Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013).
Hypothesis 4 testing
The fourth hypothesis (H4) in this study is assuming other factors remain, the independence of the internal audit committee negatively affect the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. To know the acceptance or rejection of this hypothesis, it must be seen how the influence of internal audit committee independence variable (ACI) to variable aggressiveness of company taxation (TAG). Table 2 shows that the P> │z│ value of the ACI variable is 0.4030 and the resulting ACI coefficient is (+) or positive so that the decision taken is H4 rejected or with other factor assumptions fixed, the independence of the internal audit committee has no effect negative to corporate tax aggressiveness. This result is contrary to the results of research by Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013).
Discussion
All hypotheses in this study are rejected so that it can be concluded that supervision by the board of commissioners is not able to reduce the practice of tax aggressiveness committed by the management company. The commissioner and supervisory function undertaken is part of corporate governance. In Indonesia, there are several studies that provide similar results with this study. For example, Hanum's (2013) research results in Ariyani (2014) show that the characteristics of corporate governance have no significant effect on ETR. The results of Angela's (2014) study also show that governance characteristics do not have a significant effect on corporate tax aggressiveness.
The results of this study contradict the results of research Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) who use the object of research in Australia. This may be due to differences in governance practices in Australia and Indonesia. In Australia, listed companies are required to own and implement governance under the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. In Indonesia, listed companies have not been required to own and implement governance until 2016 after the issuance of OJK Regulation Number 21 / POJK.04 / 2015 and SE OJK Number 32 / SEOJK.04 / 2015. For the previous years, KNKG has issued the General Guidelines of Good Corporate Governance of Indonesia, but the guidelines are not yet an obligation to be performed listed company.
Explanation about the influence of each of the characteristics of supervisory board of commissioner against tax aggressiveness described as follows. a. The effect of RMS on TAG The first hypothesis is rejected or assuming other factors remain, the company in which its board of commissioners establishes an effective risk management system and internal control does not negatively affect the tax aggressiveness of the company. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that the company in which its board of commissioners establishes an effective risk management system and effective internal control has no effect on corporate tax aggressiveness. This result is contrary to the results of Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) research. However, the results of this study are consistent with the results of research Pinandhito (2016) . This may be due to differences in Australian and Indonesian rules regarding risk management and internal control.
In Australia, ASX Principle 7 Guidelines require the company's chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) to provide information to the board of commissioners regarding the effectiveness of the implementation of the risk management system and internal controls. If the CEO and CFO can not assert that the company's internal risk management and control systems are operating effectively, then they should state explicitly in the company's annual report. In Indonesia, KNKG issued the 1999 Indonesian General Good Corporate Governance Guidelines, which were subsequently revised in 2001 and 2006. The guidelines state that the directors need to provide statements regarding the effectiveness of the implementation of internal controls, which also includes risk management, in its annual report. However The second hypothesis is rejected or with other factor assumptions fixed, the use of big-4 audit firm services does not negatively affect the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that the use of the services of big-4 audit firms has no effect on corporate tax aggressiveness. This result contradicts the results of Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) and Francis (2004) research. However, the results of this study are consistent with the results of Tehupuring (2016), Sari et al. (2016) , and Wibawa et al. (2016) .
There are several reasons why this hypothesis may be rejected. First, audits by big-4 firm audits and non-big-4 firm audits do not have a significant difference in mitigating tax evasion practices (Tehupuring 2016) . Second, Sari et al. (2016) that basically, big-4 audit firms tend to be more trusted because they always apply the existing rules in quality. However, if the company can provide better benefits and welfare, a reputable KAP can commit fraud to maximize its welfare. Third, the quality of external auditors has no significant effect on tax evasion because all KAPs in Indonesia have basically audited in accordance with the prevailing regulations (Wibawa et al., 2016) . The proxy used in this study is the proportion of fees for non-audit services paid to the external auditor of the total cost paid to the external auditor. There are some similar conditions for external auditors both in Indonesia and in the United States (US) in order to be declared independent. One is not to provide non audit services to the auditee for the same period with the period of audit services. One of the non-audit services in Rule Number VIII.A. The reason given by Lennox (2016) for the results of his research is that with the difference of parties providing audit services and tax services, the exchange of information between financial information and taxation information becomes more difficult to do so the quality of audits performed becomes lower. Another reason is that the party providing taxation services has no responsibility for the financial health of the company so they can provide tax advice that may lead to material misstatements in the company's financial statements. d. The effect of ACI on TAG The fourth hypothesis is rejected or with other factor assumptions fixed, the independence of the internal audit committee does not negatively affect the aggressiveness of the corporate tax. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that the independence of internal audit committees has no influence on the aggressiveness of corporate taxes. This result is contrary to the results of Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2013) and Abbott et al. (2000) . However, the results of this study are consistent with the results of several previous studies.
In Indonesia, Ariyani's (2014) and Pinandhito (2016) studies show that audit committee independence has no significant effect on tax aggressiveness. The results of both studies may be related to the implementation of Rule Number IX.I.5 number 2 and item 3 letter b in the Decision of the Chairman of Bapepam LK Number 29 / PM / 2004 on the Formation and Implementation Guidelines of the Audit Committee. The rule forces the company to have an independent audit committee. Research outside of Indonesia that has similar results with this research is Klein (2002) research in the US and Dridi and Boubaker (2016) in Tunisia. As in Indonesia, every member of the audit committee of a company in the US must also be declared independently under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
V. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
A. Conclusion
Based on test results and discussion in Chapter IV, the authors conclude several things as follows:
The result of t test for the RMS variable shows the value of 0.1865 and the resulting coefficient sign is (-) so that the first hypothesis in this study is rejected or with other fixed factor assumptions, the company in which its board of commissioners determines the system of risk management and effective internal control has no effect negative to corporate tax aggressiveness.
The t test result for the AUD variable shows the value of 0.4890 and the resulting coefficient sign is (-) so that the second hypothesis in this study is rejected or with other factor assumptions fixed, the use of big-4 audit firm services does not negatively affect the tax aggressiveness of the firm.
The result of t test for EAI variable shows the value of 0.0005 and the resulting coefficient sign is (-) or negative so that the third hypothesis in this study is rejected or with other factor assumption fixed, the independence of weak external auditor does not positively influence to corporate tax aggressiveness.
The result of t test for ACI variable shows the value of 0.4030 and the resulting coefficient sign is (+) so that the fourth hypothesis in this study is rejected or with other factor assumptions fixed, the independence of the internal audit committee does not negatively affect the tax aggressiveness of the company.
Control variables that significantly affect the aggressiveness of corporate taxes are SIZE, YEAR2, and YEAR3. SIZE has a positive effect on corporate tax aggressiveness, while YEAR2 and YEAR3 have a negative effect on corporate tax aggressiveness.
The regression model has fulfilled the goodness of fit. Based on the coefficient of determination (R2) concluded that the contribution of all independent variables and control on variation of dependent variable is 24.40%, while the rest of 75.60% is explained by other factors not included in the regression model in this study.
Based on the result of F statistic test, all independent and control variables simultaneously have a significant effect on the aggressiveness of corporate tax at 95% level.
B. Limitation
This research has several limitations in its implementation, which include: 
C. Suggestion
From the results of this study there are several suggestions that the author can provide as follows:
1. Using other criteria for sampling in subsequent research, eg companies that enter the manufacturing sector or all companies listed on the Stock Exchange. 2. Using proxies other than GAAP ETR to measure TAG variables in subsequent research. Other proxies may include cash ETR, BTD, BTD residual, and other tax aggressive proxies. 3. Using other, more definite proxies to measure RMS variables in subsequent research, eg the existence of the Risk Management Committee. 4. Using other proxies whose data are more adequate to measure EAI variables in subsequent studies, such as the length of the firm's relationship with its external auditor. 5. Using statistical tests for normality tests in subsequent research so that the normality of research data is more assured. 6. The Directorate General of Tax shall not focus on the effectiveness of internal control and risk management, the type of external auditor, the independence of the external auditor, and the independence of the audit committee in performing its duties as tax authorities in Indonesia. 
